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ABSTRACT 
The exponential growth of IR studies in religion and the rise of religious actors and agendas in the minds of international policy 
makers suggest that religion will be an organising force in world politics of the future. This paper explores from an open critical 
position the assumption that religion will shape the evolving borders of world affairs. As modern international relations was 
partly borne of the need to contain the borders of religion, it is argued that the reemergence of religion in contemporary world 
politics may, paradoxically, reinforce that same system. Twenty-first century policy makers may thus take a neo-Westphalian 
turn in search of a broad-based secular polity that utilises yet also contains religio-political energies.  
 
Secularism, sacralism and the evolving borders of world politics 
The study of religion in international relations (IR) is now as prominent as it was once neglected. 
André Malraux’s famous prognosis in 1962 that the “twenty-first century will be spiritual or it will not 
be”
2
 holds particular resonance in a field that has rapidly turned from questions of whether religion is a 
legitimate topical concern for IR scholars (e.g. Wuthnow, 1991; Berger 1999; Esposito & Watson, 2000; 
Petito & Hazopolous, 2003) to the more difficult task of knowing what to do with it now that religion has 
‘arrived’ (e.g. Thomas, 2005; Haynes, 2007; Leustean & Madeley, 2009). I begin with working definitions 
and assumptions that situate the present paper. Charles Taylor in the seminal work A Secular Age 
suggests that religion defies general definition “because the phenomena we are tempted to call religious 
are so tremendously varied in human life” and wonders whether attempts to make a hermeneutical 
linkage between ancient beliefs and contemporary society is “a hard, perhaps insuperable task” 
(2007:15). Taylor opts for the “prudent (or perhaps cowardly)” distinction of reading religion across 
transcendent and immanent understandings of human society (2007:15). This basic starting point 
reflects that of IR scholar Jeffrey Haynes who defines religion via three commonly held characteristics: 
…the idea of transcendence, that is, it relates to supernatural realities; with sacredness, that is, as a 
system of language and practice that organizes the world in terms of what is deemed holy; and with 
ultimacy, that is, it relates people to the ultimate conditions of existence. (2006:223).  
Whist acknowledging the multiple definitions of religion that exist in IR (eg: Lausten & Waever, 
2000:738; Hanson, 2006:73; Mandaville, 2009:98) Haynes’ framework will serve our purposes here. One 
addition to make to the emphasis on ‘language and practice’ is the role that religious communities play, 
thus emphasising what Scott Thomas calls a “social definition of religion … as a ‘community of believers’ 
rather than as a ‘body of beliefs’.” (Thomas, 2005:24)   
Two concepts summarise advancements in IR religion scholarship in recent years and help frame the 
elaborations to follow in this paper. The first is Martin E. Marty’s notion of the “religio-secular world” as 
a descriptor for the global political realm that is “neither exclusively secular nor exclusively religious, but 
rather a complex combination of both” (2003:42). Such a view forms part of the emerging consensus in 
                                                          
1
 Working paper to be presented at the American Graduate School of International Relations in Paris, Evolving 
Borders: Identity and Affiliation in a Volatile International Landscape, Graduate Conference, June 1-2, 2010. 
2
 “Le XXIème siècle sera spirituel, ou ne sera pas” (cited in Mathy, 2004:415) 
2 
 
the social sciences around ‘desecularisation’ to the extent that “a straightforward narrative of progress 
from the religious to the secular” as a way of interpreting modern societies “is no longer acceptable” 
(Asad, 2003:1).
3
 Such a view is expressed in a variety of ways in IR, from a general discontent at leaving 
“religion on the sidelines” (Tickner, 2006:390; also Keddie, 2003) to critiques of the secular assumptions 
that shape the discipline itself (Philpott 2002; Keohane, 2002:29; Hurd, 2008). Empirical studies have 
also led to a more dynamic assumption about religious agency, summarised by Jonathan Fox thus: 
A fuller picture of the world’s religious economy would show secularisation – the reduction of religion’s 
influence in society – occurring in some parts of the religious economy, and sacralisation – the increase 
of religion’s influence in society – occurring in other parts. (Fox, 2008:7; also Berger 1999:18)  
This presents us with an integrated and possibly co-constitutive picture of secular-sacral relations in 
contemporary world politics. Importantly, if we accept the premise that international affairs exist in a 
religio-secular world, then what we are trying to avoid are methodologies intent on vindicating the 
religious over the secular or visa-versa. Placing secularisation and sacralisation within the same global 
process requires an important modification to our terminology, and I appeal to a well-known article on 
globalisation by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye as a way of doing this:    
Globalisation implies that something is increasing: there is more of it … Our definitions start with 
‘globalism’, a condition that can increase or decrease. Globalism is a state of the world involving networks 
of interdependence … Globalisation or deglobalisation refer to the increase or decrease of globalism. 
(Keohane & Nye, 2000:105-107; see also Kitching, 2001) 
In the same way, I suggest that what the work of IR scholars such as Marty and Fox attest to are the co-
existing conditions of secularism and sacralism in world politics. Religion is not on the march in the form 
of sacralisation (ie it is not uniformly increasing in influence), but sacralism is a condition that constitutes 
the political in fundamental ways. Similarly, although secularisation (as the lineal expansion of 
modernity leading to the diminishing of religion in the public sphere) has limited evidence to support it 
on a global scale, secularism (as the strategy to contain or co-opt religious actors and interests for extra-
religious political purposes) remains a central element in international politics today. Building on these 
notions I suggest that the secular sphere of international relations is one where religious actors and 
interests are subordinate to more dominant structures and ideologies. Similarly, the sacral sphere is one 
where religion is a primary element in the formation of a given polity.  
The second concept is R. Scott Appleby’s notion of the “ambivalence of the sacred” and the political 
implications of the dual possibilities of life and death that “reside within the holy” (2000:30).  That is to 
say, religion brings multiple often contrasting dynamics into the political sphere such as conflict 
(2000:57ff) on the one hand and peace-making on the other (2000: 121ff). This marks a corrective to the 
lingering habit of restricting the dynamics of religion to zero-sum conflicts involving terrorism, violent 
religious nationalism and clashes between ‘civilisations’. Instead, the notion of ambivalence ascribes to 
religion a ubiquity that leads to connections with peace-making as much as conflict (Johnston & Cox, 
2003), liberalism as much as terrorism (Dunning, 2003), democracy as much as despotism (Keane, 
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1998:25-31; Rees, 2004) and theoretical considerations of security and identity that go beyond 
realpolitik (Lausten & Waever, 2000).  Therefore, as religion was once well-contained within the 
conceptual borders that considered it only to be a threat in a world of industrialised nation-states and 
modern global interests, the notion of ambivalence has helped see those borders change and evolve. 
This process does not jettison the religion problematique, but incorporates it into a new basic 
assumption of how “really existing” religion functions in the political sphere (Elshtain, 1999).  Such a 
view of religion as offering both life and death has long been familiar to those who have belonged to 
religious communities, held religious beliefs or studied religious traditions. As the 19
th
 century Hindu 
mystic Ramakrishna remarked, “Religion is like a cow. It kicks, but it also gives milk.” (Sharma, 2006:xiv) 
So it is that the life-giving milk of religion is being increasingly offered among networks of IR scholars 
and international policy-makers4 many of whom have only digested a discourse on religious violence and 
disruption. Whilst the new taste remains an acquired one, rates of consumption are increasing.  
An increased focus on religion in IR redefines the international realm as one that a) accommodates 
the conditions of secularism and sacralism (religio-secular world) and b) is animated by both 
constructive and destructive religious influences (ambivalence of the sacred). This poses a significant 
challenge for a discipline that in large part still “takes the Euro-American definition of religion and its 
separation of politics as the natural starting point for social-scientific inquiry” (Hurd, 2008:23). I shall 
now explore some possible implications of this challenge for an understanding of the evolving 
boundaries of international relations in the twenty-first century. It is often said that IR is not a predictive 
science, and in this vein what follows is not intended to forecast the future. In keeping with the 
exploratory trajectory of the AGS conference, I suggest what may appear to be an unexpected theme of 
the evolving borders of world affairs. The arguments are broad in scope, intended to open conversations 
rather than resolve them, as notable for the spaces that need to be filled as for the contents that are 
provided. In this I follow the view of Rabbi and political theorist Jonathan Sacks who wrote: “sometimes 
it is helpful to simplify, to draw a diagram rather than a map, in order to understand what may be at 
stake in a social transition” (1997:55).  
Reinforcing Borders: religion and the return of the state in international affairs 
I shall adopt an open critical position on the issue of religious agency and its impact on the borders of 
world politics into the twenty-first century. The general argument I wish to explore follows that as 
modern international relations was partly borne of the need to contain the borders of religion, the 
reemergence of religious agency in contemporary world politics may, paradoxically, reinforce the same 
need once more. To elaborate, I shall revisit the meaning of the Westphalian system of international 
relations, distinguish between two co-existing levels of religion at work in this system, and suggest two 
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contexts where the rise of religion may well lead to a neo-Westphalian turn and the strengthening of 
secular politics. 
a) Westphalia: blurring the secular-sacral distinction 
I begin with the argument that at the origins of the modern world order of nation-states lies a 
complex interaction of secularism and religion. Via “the great multidimensional conflict” (Kennedy, 
1988:36) of the Thirty Years War the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648 granting secular political 
authorities determining powers over the role of religion in their domains. Yet in this context the primacy 
of secularism comes not at the expense of sacralism in toto, but in its re-appropriation. Oliver 
O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan mark the mid-seventeenth century as the time of decisive 
break between the theological and rationalist traditions of political thought:
 
 
The key to this interpretation lies in the reading of Hobbes and Grotius side by side. Grotius, for all his 
embrace of the program of a humanistic science, was a true heir of the theological tradition; Hobbes, for all 
his wealth of theological opinions, broke with the structure of Christian political thought (1999:787).  
 
The Treaty of Westphalia, one of the cornerstone documents at the origin of the modern secular state, 
comes only two years after the death of Grotius and mid-way through the life of Hobbes. It could 
therefore be argued that Westphalia marks the beginning of a politically secular European international 
society. Yet Casanova suggests that although the Westphalian principles were “institutionalised 
throughout society so that the social realm itself was dualistically structured” between the religious and 
the secular there was also “ample ambiguity, flexibility, permeability, and often outright confusion” 
between such a boundary in the political formation process (1994:12-17). This ambiguity blurs our 
understandings of the secular-sacral distinction at the foundations of the international system. Even as 
the fabric of secular society was being created, the thread of religio-political thought remained 
unbroken and was being woven into the texture of a new European modernity. Grotius was more than 
the ‘last’ political theologian of his time. Via readings and misreadings
5
 of his doctrine of natural law he 
became, as it were, at once the founding father of natural law theory, a contributing member of the just 
war tradition and one of the mid-wives of international law (Jeffrey, 2006:14-16). Grotius thus embodies 
both the divestment and reinvestment of religion in political thought. Marked by a similar complexity, 
Westphalia can be considered secular but also sacral of a sort.
 
According to Thomas, “the Westphalian 
settlement established a political theology for modern international relations…a doctrine that prescribes 
what the role of religion and political authority should be in domestic and international politics that has 
lasted 300 years” (2005:55). The Westphalian milieu is thus replete with the agencies of religion 
(Philpott, 2000) the dynamics of which have since animated international affairs in foundational ways 
until the present day. 
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b) Religionism: cosmopolitan and community  
One such dynamic is what I shall call the tension between two co-existing expressions of political 
religion, or to be more precise, religion operating at two co-existing levels of political society. The first is 
cosmopolitan religionism and exemplified in the enlightenment republicanism that arose in France 150 
years after Westphalia. At the core of the cosmopolitan project lay a Westphalian strategy to transform 
independent sacral interests into civil religion subordinate to the state. Napoleon Bonaparte once 
wrote, “In religion I do not see the mystery of the Incarnation, but the mystery of the social order” (cited 
in Lyons, 1994:85). For Bonaparte, himself a staunch defender of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Contrat 
Social, the maintenance of such an order did not require the suppression of religion as others had done, 
but its re-appropriation as a second-order yet important attribute of a cosmopolitan secular polity 
(Horne, 2004:33).
6
 Such a view was antithetical to the community religionism of the romantic 
movements that originally arose from the Pietism of post-Reformation Germany (Berlin, 1965/1999:36). 
By the time Napoleon’s forces conquered Prussia the philosopher Fichte would decry cosmopolitans as 
“a mere annex to life” in contrast to the “the Urvolk, the primal people”. The latter point, as Berlin 
suggests, is characterised more by an emphasis on community within a broad ranging idea of the 
Germanic peoples (including the French) than by primary ethnic prejudice associated with later 
movements of German national chauvinism (1965/1999:96).  
Of interest here is the level at which such a conception of primordial identity operates, and its 
implication for understanding where religion resides: in contrast to the existence of civic religion 
operating at the universal level for cosmopolitans, community religionism was found in organic and 
unique cultures (Smith, 2001:33-39).
7
 Such brevity, of course, does no justice to these historical 
movements that are as complex as religion itself. My intention, however, is simply to suggest 
contrasting expressions of religion, operating at different levels of the political sphere – cosmopolitan 
religionism at the universal level and communal religionism at the particular level. The distinction in the 
levels at which religionism operates in international affairs is not necessarily unique to the late 
twentieth century and beyond. For instance, religious structures have arguably operated at the 
international and communal levels for over a millennium (e.g. Bennison, 2002). I have offered a Euro-
centric example in order to draw a continuum from Westphalia, which is so fundamental to the origins 
of the discipline of IR, even though the basic contrast of cosmopolitan and communal could be applied 
to multiple contexts and traditions. In so doing I assume, both at the normative and empirical levels, 
that forms of cosmopolitan and communal religionism continue from the early modern centuries until 
the present day.   
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c) Toward a neo-Westphalian turn in contemporary international relations  
I shall now briefly explore why the twenty-first century may see, at least in some contexts of 
international affairs and despite the rapid rise of religion as a focus of world politics, new forms of 
Westphalian control in order to deal with the tensions between the different forms of religion described 
above. I begin with one expression of cosmopolitan religionism, namely, the growing emphasis on 
religious actors and interests within the policy domains of international organisations (IOs). The United 
Nations, World Health Organisation (Thomas, 2005:25), World Bank (Marshall & Van Saanen, 2007) and 
the International Labour Organisation (Peccoud, 2004) are among some of the most prominent IOs to 
launch specific engagements with religion in the past two decades. Religious institutions have also taken 
the form of IOs from state coalitions such as the Organisation of Islamic Council, international faith 
networks within the same tradition such as the World Council of Churches, international inter-faith 
forums such as the Parliament of the World’s Religions, and transnational networks on issues of shared 
concern such as the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (Palmer & Finlay, 2003). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore specific programs in detail as I have done elsewhere.
8
 I intend instead to 
pose a more general and exploratory argument, namely, that the increased prominence of religion at 
the international level by necessity perpetuates forms of cosmopolitan religionism and this creates 
inherent tensions at the level of community. When religious actors and interests are engaged at the 
cosmopolitan level the emphasis is on the cooperative potential of faith politics to contribute to what 
Hans Kung describes as “the human values and standards which, in our contemporary and globalising 
world, can be regarded as universally valid and acceptable” (2003:152).
9
 In other words, IOs require a 
certain kind of multilateral religionism that is palatable to mainstream global interests to the possible 
exclusion of more dissident religious views that challenge such interests. When religion operates at this 
level and within these conditions it must take a subordinate role to universal interests that are more 
secular than sacral.  
Not everyone agrees that this is the best way to understand religion or maximize the potential of 
religious actors to contribute to international society. For example, Tariq Ramadan has recently written 
of the problem in the West of insisting that Muslims be “moderate” which in essence requires that they 
“make their faith invisible” (2010:24). This kind of moderation sets the cosmopolitan subordination of 
religion against the community religionism of the faith itself: 
In Western societies where the practice and day-to-day visibility of religion are close to zero…to speak of 
daily prayers, fasting, of religiously grounded moral obligations, prohibitions and dress codes is often seen 
as automatically verging on excess.  (Ramadan, 2010:24) 
What seems excess to the liberal cosmopolitan is core practice to some or many in the community. For 
scholars such as Thomas, who aligns religion more closely to Alasdair MacIntyre’s communitarian 
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emphasis
10
 on “virtues, practices, narrative and social tradition” (2005:219), the cosmopolitan 
understanding of religious agency is inadequate because the kind of identity required at the 
international level – in Ramadan’s example, moderation as invisibility in the West – is not always 
recognisable at the level of community practice.11 Thomas instead looks to the level of community in 
order to find the utility of religion in the building of political and social capital: “the ‘good’, therefore, of 
the Islamic, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist tradition, is the formation of a particular kind of 
community, one that inculcates those virtues and practices necessary for what it means to authentically 
live out life according to a particular religious tradition” (2005:238). In this context, religious particularity 
may challenge the demands of international universalism at the political level.  
d) The Example of Hezbollah: community religionism, international terrorism, and the agency of the state 
An example might be found when a group that has grass-roots political support is associated with a 
form of religious communalism that is also considered disruptive to security at the international level. 
This can be seen in Mona Harb’s recent study of Hezbollah as an important faith-based organisation in 
the post-war reconstruction of Lebanon (2008). Against the commonly held view of Hezbollah as a 
terrorist organisation, Harb considers Hezbollah to be “a Lebanese political party which has been in 
charge of the elaboration and dissemination of development policies for middle and lower-income Shi’i 
groups for over 25 years” (2008:214). This context adds depth beyond descriptions of the “moral logic” 
of Hezbollah’s association with terrorism (Kramer, 1998) and instead emphasizes the ambivalence of 
religion at work in this complex religio-secular space. Community is the starting point. Harb estimates 
the lower estimates of Hezbollah’s social base in which development is practiced to be no less than 
300,000 (2008:220). The author attributes Hezbollah with a high level of agency not merely to work 
within Lebanon but to determine the very nature of a faith-based society (2008:222-226): 
Hezbollah’s institutions disseminate codes, norms and values that produce a particular type of social and 
cultural environment, structuring daily life practices, as well as subjective and collective identities. This 
environment, or Hezbollah’s reference group, is referred to as the Islamic sphere (hala islamiyya) or the 
‘Resistance society’ (mujtama’ al-muqawama). (Harb, 2008:222) 
One might, with good reason, disassociate such a description with an integrated religio-secular 
understanding of the political. However, Harb adds two additional elements that complicate this view. 
The first is that “Islamic sphere narratives have increasingly borrowed national references and symbols 
from Lebanese folklore…proposing a hybrid type of national discourse, mixing secularism with 
religiosity” (2008:223). The second is that “there is considerable overlap between [Hezbollah’s] 
paradigms of development and those of international donors, and they are open to learning and 
improvement” (2008:234). When these elements combine, we may well situate Hezbollah as a 
development actor that holds to the primacy of religious identity but incorporates secondary secular 
state structures as well as the need to learn from “a type of knowledge that goes beyond [the] current 
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scope and concern of [its own] institutions” (2008:234) in order to fulfill its development mandate. 
Therefore, Hezbollah is arguably defined as a sacral development institution with significant potential to 
contribute to the mainstream development agenda. The tension between the universal and local 
becomes immediately apparent when one considers how a group that still resides on UN and US State 
Department lists of terrorist organizations can possibly be included in the cosmopolitan international 
project of promoting human values and standards regarded as universally valid and acceptable.  
 The answer implicit in Harb’s engaging depiction lies in the instrumental pressures of statehood, both 
to further incorporate the religious dimension into the operations of the greater Lebanese state, and to 
subordinate religious interests to the broader agendas and methods of political development. In short, a 
form of neo-Westphalian strategy is required to contain excessive religio-political energies in the 
interests of a broad-based secular polity. To think that this or similar scenarios of state agency are not 
possible, is to misconceive the complex dynamics between secularism and sacralism at the origins of the 
nation-state. Westphalia and its consequences led to the subordination of religion to the purposes of 
the state, but in so doing, the architects of secular modernism often believed that faiths could adapt to 
these strictures, and thus could remain an important part of the political society. As Bonaparte once 
wrote: “How can a state be well governed without the aid of religion?” (cited in Horne, 2004:14).
12
 In 
the contemporary context, the realization is growing that religions can offer such “aid” because they are 
highly adaptable: “Religion is among other things, a complicated multifaceted social phenomenon that is 
constantly changing, evolving, and adapting to an ever-changing environment.” (Fox 2007:30) As a 
consequence, one impact of religion upon twenty-first century politics may be the embrace of neo-
Westphalian forms of governance at the state level to maximize the potentialities of religion in ways 
that cosmopolitan and community level appropriations of religion cannot.  
Implications for Twenty-First Century Politics 
Several important consequences follow to arguing that the rise of religion in the world affairs will 
lead to a strengthening of state power. They become pointers to further research and discussion beyond 
the more substantial arguments I have attempted to construct above. The first is that the twenty-first 
century will continue to be provoked by a lack of religious freedom, notably where religious minorities 
do not have equal rights with those of the majority. In suggesting the possibility of a neo-Westphalian 
turn in world affairs I am not advocating for the virtue of the state per se. Indeed, were it to be true the 
forecast of this paper would set back the cause of transborder religious minorities significantly in some 
contexts. It might also produce new forms of excessive secularist repression of religion in other 
contexts.
13
 The second consequence is that sacralism operating at the state level will survive much 
longer than expected. For instance, Iran is a state that, at the ideological level at least, seems shaped by 
the primacy of a particular religio-cultural tradition. Because of this ideology the Iranian state has also 
been forecast to fall or collapse almost since the Islamic revolution began in 1979, yet has endured to 
this day. Whilst there are many possible explanations to this, some of which have little to do with 
                                                          
12
 Napoleon’s reasons for saying this, it should be added, are purely instrument: “It was by becoming a Catholic 
that I pacified the Vendée…If I ruled a people of Jews, I would rebuild the temple of Solomon!” (cited in Horne, 
2004:15) 
13
 The Swiss referendum (Nov 2009) banning the construction of minarets could be interpreted in this way.   
9 
 
religion, it remains true that for thirty years this great power of the Middle East has been governed by a 
religious council and inspired (particularly outside of the cosmopolitan cities) by a theopolitical vision 
(see Nasr, 2006). Iran is thus an example of the complexity of secular-sacral influences that were once 
considered retrograde to modern international relations but may emerge in new contexts and 
expressions into the future. The third consequence is that the combination of religionism and statism 
might yet produce new forms of religious expression in the contemporary world. James Clifford 
famously wrote that “‘cultures’ do not hold still for their portraits” (1986:10). It is equally true of 
religions and may be most interestingly seen in contexts where religious nationalism continues to 
impact religious community practice. The United States has arguably produced two new religions to 
date, namely, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day Saints and the Nation of Islam. This should not 
surprise in a context that has historically fused the existence of the nation-state with the transcendent 
commission of Manifest Destiny producing an almost perfect accommodation of secularism and 
sacralism in the modern world. 
Whatever can be said for these and other possible consequences of the rise of religion in a world of 
enduring nation-states, religion may yet continue to defy ultimate cooption by secular or sacral interests 
alone. What Berger notes of the present evidence I also wish to apply to the future: “those that have 
great hopes for the role of religion in the affairs of the world and those who fear this role must be 
disappointed by the factual evidence.” (1999:18) Such a view returns us to a necessary understanding of 
religion as operating in a secular-sacral world, and encourages an ambivalent view of the political effects 
of religious agency. The shift in perspectives to consider these as normal rather than exceptional 
dynamics in the study of international relations may yet prove to be one of the most valuable evolutions 
in our thinking to date.    
  
10 
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